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Some Thoughts on Proposed Revisions to the 
Organizational Guidelines 
Julie R. O'Sullivan· 
In this article, Professor 0 'Sullivan, who served as the reporter for the u.s. 
Sentencing Commission's Ad Hoc Advisory Group for Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, reflects on that Group's work. She concludes that the potential impact of 
many of the policy fixes within the power of the Sentencing Commission is dwarfed by 
decisions that lie solely within the power of the Department of Justice or Congress. 
Specifically, Department of Justice decisions regarding what constitutes 
organizational "cooperation" may have a determinative impact on organizational 
incentives regarding compliance efforts and decisions to investigate, self-report, and 
cooperate in the remediation of organizational wrongdoing. Professor 0 'Sullivan 
also describes how congressional inattention handicaps the Commission's attempts to 
introduce consideration of corporate culpability into organizational sentencing and 
leaves in place important disincentives for effective compliance created by the 
"litigation dilemma." Finally, Professor 0 'Sullivan also discusses the Sentencing 
Commission's foray into organizational "best practices" for compliance purposes. 
She concludes that although the Sentencing Commission's mandate is restricted to 
formulating guidelines that govern the determination of organizational culpability for 
purposes of criminal sentencing, attention to the purposes of criminal punishment in 
this context requires the Commission to create, in essence, a flexible compliance 
manual that outlines practices and structures necessary to effective systems for 
preventing and detecting violations of law. 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that control the sentencing of organizations for 
most federal criminal violations (the "organizational guidelines" or "Chapter 8") 
became effective on November 1, 1991.1 In crafting the organizational guidelines, the 
Sentencing Commission adopted what some characterize as a "carrot and stick," and 
others term a "deterrence and just punishment," approach: 
The centerpiece of the Sentencing Guidelines structure is the fine 
range, from which a sentencing court selects the precise fine to 
impose on a convicted organization. The Commission designed the 
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. The views expressed in this piece are my own, 
and do not represent the views of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. My thanks to Alan C. Michaels for his interest and his seemingly 
endless patience and understanding. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2002), available at htlp://www.ussc.gov/ 
2002guid/tabconchapt8.htm. 
487 
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guideline provisions that established the fine range to meld the two 
philosophical approaches to sentencing emphasized in the enabling 
legislation: just punishment for the offense, and deterrence. By 
varying the fine based on whether, and to what extent, a company 
has acted "responsibly" with respect to an offense, the Guidelines 
embody a "just punishment for the offense" philosophy. Consistent 
with this paradigm, the Guidelines provide for substantial fines 
when a convicted organization has encouraged, or has been 
indifferent to, violations of the law by its employees, but impose 
significantly lower fines when a corporation has clearly 
demonstrated in specific ways its antipathy toward lawbreaking. 
At the same time, the guideline structure embodies principles 
derived from the deterrence paradigm. The specified ways in 
which a convicted organization may demonstrate its intolerance of 
criminal conduct, thus entitling it to a more lenient sentence, are 
actions that, at least theoretically, should discourage employees 
from committing offenses.2 
The "carrot and stick" approach grew out of the Commission's acceptance of 
three propositions. First and foremost, the Commission recognized that the 
respondeat superior principles of organizational liability did not adequately respond to 
gradations in corporate culpability.3 The simple equation of the corporation with the 
corporate actor necessary for liability does not reflect on the relative blameworthiness 
ofthe corporation itself.4 Second, the Commission came to believe that corporations 
could "hold out the promise of fewer violations in the first instance and greater 
detection and remediation of offenses when they occur"s through internal discipline, 
reformation of standard operating procedures, auditing standards, the corporate 
culture, and institution of corporate compliance programs reflecting such reforms. 
Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines/or Corporations: 
Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 205, 210-12 (1993). 
"The black letter law of corporate criminal liability is straightforward: a corporation is liable for 
the criminal misdeeds of its agents acting within the actual or apparent scope of their employment or 
authority if the agents intend, at least in part, to benefit the corporation, even though their actions may be 
contrary to corporate policy or express corporate order." JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 202 (2d ed. 2003). 
4 Winthrop M. Swenson, The Organizational Guidelines' "Carrot and Stick" Philosophy, and 
Their Focus on "Effective" Compliance, reprinted in U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, MATERIALS FOR 
PROGRAM ON CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION 5 
(Sept. 7, 1995) ("The Commission came to recognize that the doctrine of vicarious criminal liability for 
corporations operates in such a way that very different kinds of corporations can be convicted of crimes; 
from companies whose managers did everything reasonably possible to prevent and uncover wrongdoing, 
but whose employees broke the law anyway, to companies whose managers encouraged or directed the 
wrongdoing. "). 
Id. at 6. 
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Finally, and critically, the Commission concluded that it could create incentives for 
responsible corporate actors to foster crime control by the creation of a mandatory 
guidelines penalty structure that rewarded responsible corporate behavior and ensured 
certain and harsh sanctions for truly culpable corporations. In short, the Commission 
defined its objectives as: creating a model for the good corporate citizen; using the 
model to make corporate sentencing fair and predictable; and ultimately employing 
the model to create incentives for corporations to take crime controlling steps. 
One manifestation of the organizational guidelines' underlying "carrot and stick" 
philosophy-which has as its object galvanizing organizational efforts to prevent 
organizational wrongdoing-is an important sentencing credit that organizations can 
claim for having an "effective program to prevent and detect violations oflaw.,,6 In 
February 2002, the u.s. Sentencing Commission constituted the Ad Hoc Advisory 
Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (affectionately referred to within 
as "AGOG" or the "Advisory Group") and charged it with evaluating the operation of 
the organizational guidelines and, in particular, whether the guidelines' definition of 
an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law" required updating or 
amending. 7 
The Advisory Group tendered for the Commission's consideration a voluminous 
report and specific suggested revisions to Chapter 8 in October 2003.8 A few months 
later, the Sentencing Commission published proposed amendments to Chapter 8, 
which were substantively identical9 to those submitted by AGOG, for comment in the 
Federal Register. lO I was privileged to serve as a member of, and the reporter for, 
AGOG and have been asked to provide a short introduction for the portions of the 
excerpted report reprinted within. II 
Our group was comprised of fifteen individuals with backgrounds in federal 
criminal prosecution and defense, federal probation, legal academia, business, 
6 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f); see also id. § 8Cl.2, cmt. n. 3(k) 
(defInition of an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law"). 
See U.S. Sentencing Commission, News Release (Feb. 21, 2002), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/reI0202.htm; see also Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 
Fed. Reg. 48306 (Sept. 19,2001) (U.S. Sentencing Commission's announcement of its intention to form 
advisory group to study the organizational guidelines), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
FEDREG/fedr90 I_OA.htm. 
See Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (Oct. 7, 
2003) [hereinafter Advisory Group Report], available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/AppB.pdf; 
see also id. at App. B (proposed revised chapter 8) [hereinafter Proposed U.S.S.G.]. 
9 The version published by the Sentencing Commission added brackets around one proposal. See 
infra text following note 47. 
IO See Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, Proposed Amendment 2,68 Fed. Reg. 
75339 (Dec. 30,2003 & Jan. 14,2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guidlriJan04.pdf. 
II I must note that although I was the reporter for the Advisory Group, I was not solely responsible 
for its written work product. Many sections of the report were authored by other members of the 
Advisory Group, and the Commission's staff was extremely helpful in shepherding our draft efforts into a 
fmal report. 
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corporate compliance, and business ethics. 12 At our introductory meeting, my initial 
reaction was that getting a substantive piece of work product out of a group as large 
and varied as ours would be difficult or-in the more colorful view of another 
member-attempting to create consensus around the table would be like "herding 
cats." I was wrong. 
I credit the then Chair of the Commission, Judge Diana Murphy, with selecting 
members who-virtually to a person-dedicated a great deal of time, labor and 
thought to the project and were committed to producing a comprehensive and detailed 
report. Whether or not readers agree with the substance of our report, I hope that they 
will recognize the amount of careful effort that went into it. Judge Murphy also had 
the vision to enlist a (former) Marine to be the Chair and chief cat-herder. Todd 
Jones, a former U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota who is now a partner in 
the firm of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P., made clear from the outset that he 
would set a schedule that we were all expected to meet, and that whatever difficulties 
we encountered throughout our deliberations would have to be worked out before the 
final report was issued. He was a skillful andfirm Chair throughout the process. In 
committees such as this, the Department of Justice is often the 600-pound gorilla in 
the room-for good or ill. Whoever selected our representative from the Department 
of Justice did us a huge favor. Mary Beth Buchanan, who is the U.S. Attorney for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania as well as the Chair of the Attorney General's 
Advisory Committee, earned the respect, trust, and regard of everyone in the group; as 
a result, she was able to represent the Department's interests in a constructive, as well 
as a zealous, way. Finally, the Commission's staff was unfailingly helpful and (thank 
goodness) even lent us support in one area in which we did not have any expertise: 
drafting in guidelines-speak. 
Two factors contributed most to the substance of the Advisory Group's 
recommendations. First, Todd Jones' constant admonition was that the group was to 
have "big ears." We chose to interpret this as a directive to get out there and solicit 
the views of all interested constituencies. The Group also made two requests for 
public comments. 13 The first request was designed to beat the bushes for general 
diagnoses regarding the efficacy of the existing guidelines, and the second was 
intended to elicit commentary on more specific issues generated by the first set of 
comments and our own personal investigations and ruminations. We then held a 
hearing, at which we worked to get the testimony and statements of different 
constituencies and persons with a range of experience in sentencing and compliance. 14 
12 See Advisory Group Report, supra note 8, at App. A, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
corp/advgrprpt/ AppA.pdf (list of Advisory Group members and brief resumes for same). 
13 See Advisory Group for Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: Request for Additional Public 
Comment Regarding the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (Oct. 15,2002), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/pubcom8_02.pdf; Advisory Group for Organizational Guidelines: Request for 
Public Comment (March 19,2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/pubcom_301IPC_302.htm. 
Responses to these requests for comment are available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ 
pubcom_l 0021PC_1 002.htm. 
14 Transcripts of the public hearing sessions (and any accompanying written comments) are 
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We were also blessed with a deep reservoir of compliance and business ethics 
expertise on the committee. 
After digesting all this input, as well as what we were able to mine from the 
scholarly and practice literature, surveys, and compliance materials, we had a good 
sense of developments in the compliance area since the organizational guidelines were 
inaugurated. 15 In a sense, we attempted to bring the guidelines full circle-that is, 
reestablish the guidelines as the foundation for future progress in refining what 
constitutes an "effective" program. 
The guidelines have been commonly credited with creating a boom in 
organizational compliance efforts. As a consequence, a consulting industry has been 
created and significant organizational attention-in a wide variety of industries and 
businesses-has been devoted to determining how best to structure and maintain 
effective compliance programs. The organizational guidelines also undoubtedly 
focused prosecutorial and regulatory attention on the subject. They provided 
governmental actors with a template upon which to build while formulating their own 
policies regarding what constitutes an "effective program" for purposes of making 
decisions regarding the appropriate imposition of civil and criminal penalties. Finally, 
the organizational guidelines influenced corporate law, spurring most notably in the 
Caremark decision16 judicial scrutiny of directors' duties vis-a-vis compliance. 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprptll007_Brief.pdf. 
15 By "compliance efforts," I mean the various means employed by corporations to prevent and 
detect violations of law, which generally include some or all of the features identified by the 
organizational guidelines as integral to an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law." 
Many of these are discussed, at least in part, within. See discussion infra Part D. 
16 In re Caremark Int'I Inc. Derivative Action, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). In Caremark, the 
Delaware Chancery Court was asked to approve the settlement of a shareholder derivative case alleging 
that the Caremark directors had breached their duty of care by failing to supervise the conduct of 
Caremark's employees. The court approved the settlement, but in so doing raised the question "what is 
the board's responsibility with respect to the organization and monitoring of the enterprise to assure that 
the corporation functions within the law to achieve its purposes?" Id. at 968-69. 
The Chancery Court stated that "[m]odemly this question has been given special attention by an 
increasing tendency, especially under federal law, to employ the criminal law to assure corporate 
compliance with external legal requirements" and by the organizational guidelines, "which impact 
importantly on the prospective effect these criminal sanctions might have on business corporations." Id. 
at 969. "The Guidelines offer powerful incentives for corporations today to have in place compliance 
programs to detect violations oflaw, promptly to report violations to appropriate public officials when 
discovered, and to take prompt, voluntary remedial efforts." Id. The court went on, in distinguishing a 
Delaware Supreme Court opinion that could be read to state that directors have no responsibility to assure 
adequate reporting systems are in place, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125, 125 (Del. 1963), to 
reiterate the importance of the organizational guidelines: "Any rational person attempting in good faith to 
meet an organizational governance responsibility would be bound to take into account this development 
and the enhanced penalties and the opportunities for reduced sanctions that it offers." Caremark,698 
A.2d at 970. 
The court concluded that "a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure 
that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that 
failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses 
caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards." Id. at 970. The Chancery Court's remarks 
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Our objective in making these efforts was to identify revisions that-reflect what 
criteria governmental, private, and judicial actors now believe are most likely to create 
effective programs to prevent and detect violations of law. We hoped that, after 
learning from the efforts of others, we could assist the Commission in revising 
Chapter 8 so that it will again serve as a foundation for future advances in identifying 
the best ways of preventing corporate crime, or at least nipping it in the bud. At the 
same time, we wished to maintain an important attribute of the existing guidelines: the 
balance they strike between giving general guidance to organizations, prosecutors, 
probation officers, and judges regarding the essential attributes of a successful 
program, and giving the myriad different types of organizations covered by the 
guidelines the flexibility to apply these attributes in ways that make sense in light of 
their unique characteristics and needs. In short, we strove to reflect the learning of the 
last ten years with reasonably specific, yet flexible, guidance. 
The second factor that significantly influenced our work product was the fallout 
from the corporate scandals of 2002. What began as an assignment that provoked 
barely a ripple of interest, even in the relatively small pool of those who stay abreast 
of sentencing issues or are concerned with corporate compliance issues, became over 
the course of our eighteen months of work a more urgent and high-profile task. The 
reason, of course, is that during AGOG's tenure, a series of corporate scandals 
dominated the headlines and heightened interest in crime and punishment in corporate 
suites. While the attention did not affect our deliberations, the lessons that Congress 
and other regulators drew from the revelations of corporate wrongdoing--often 
reflected in legislation and regulations----certainly did. 
I have no desire to tax readers' patience by attempting to re-write our report in 
these pages. What I hope will be of some interest are the conclusions I drew about the 
limits and challenges of the Sentencing Commission's role in attempting to deter and 
punish corporate crime. I will try to illustrate those limits and challenges by 
examining some of the issues we investigated-not necessarily in order of 
importance, but rather in the order of what they may say about the Commission's role. 
In so doing, I hope that I will also be able to touch upon much of what may be 
important or interesting about our various proposals. 
My overall thesis is that many of the policy fixes within the power of the 
Commission are dwarfed in their impact by decisions that lie solely within the power 
of the Department of Justice or Congress. Thus, in Part A, below, I explore the extent 
to which Department of Justice decisions regarding what constitutes organizational 
"cooperation" may have a determinative impact on organizational incentives to lean 
into compliance efforts-and in particular decisions to investigate, self-report, and 
cooperate in the remediation of organizational wrongdoing. In Part B, below, I 
in Caremark have raised the prospect-however attenuated--of directors' derivative liability for others' 
failures to ensure that adequate compliance programs are in place. Consequently, the Caremark decision, 
which was significantly influenced by the Organizational Guidelines, "gave the movement toward 
corporate self-policing-known as compliance planning-a kick in the pants." John Gibeaut, For Any 
Lawyer Trying to Help Keep an Honest Company Straight, a Compliance Plan is the Best Way to Root 
Out Trouble Before it Happens and to Limit Liability ifit Does, 85 A.B.A. J. 64, 66 (Jun. 1999). 
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discuss how congressional inattention to the statutory fine limits in organizational 
sentencing cases handicaps the Commission's attempts to introduce consideration of 
corporate culpability into organizational sentencing. Another critical legislative 
default is considered in Part C, which lays out the important disincentives for effective 
compliance created by the "litigation dilemma." 
Finally, in Part D I discuss objections to the Sentencing Commission's foray into 
"best practices" for compliance purposes, given that its mission is supposed to be to 
create rules to govern in criminal sentencing proceedings. I conclude that although 
the Sentencing Commission's mandate is restricted to formulating guidelines that 
govern the determination of organizational culpability for purposes of criminal 
sentencing, the purposes of criminal punishment in this context demand that the 
Commission reach more broadly and create, in essence, a flexible compliance manual 
that outlines those practices or structures which experience demonstrates are 
necessary to effective systems for the prevention and detection of violations oflaw. 
A. The Role o/the Department 0/ Justice: Clarification o/the Relationship Between 
Privilege Waivers and Cooperation Credit or Departure 
The Advisory Group attempted to explore whether the organizational guidelines 
adequately define self-reporting and cooperation in order to assess whether the 
Guidelines sufficiently reward organizations that report their own illegal activities and 
cooperate with federal law enforcement investigations. In so doing, AGOG was 
forced to inquire whether recent policy changes by the U.S. Department of Justice 
have made waiver of the protections of the attorney-client privilege and the work-
product doctrine a factor in its determination of whether an organization receives 
sentencing credit for self-reporting or cooperation and, if so, what consequences this 
policy has for compliance incentives. 
Some background here may be helpful. In 1999, then Deputy Attorney General 
(and AGOG member) Eric Holder issued a memorandum entitled Federal 
Prosecution 0/Corporations. 17 The memo was recently reissued in revised form by 
former Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson. 18 The Holder and Thompson 
Memos indicate that waiver of attorney-client and/or work-product privileges is a 
factor that either "should" or "may" be considered by United States Attorneys and 
other Justice Department enforcement personnel in charging corporate defendants, 
reaching settlements, granting amnesty and recommending sentences. 19 While this 
17 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Heads of Department 
Components and All United States Attorneys, Federal Prosecution o/Corporations (June 16, 1999) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Holder Memo). 
18 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, to Heads of Department 
Components, Principles a/Federal Prosecution o/Business Organizations (Jan. 20,2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate~idelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo]. 
19 See id. at 7 ("One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a corporation's 
cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client 
and work product protections, both with respect to its internal investigation and with respect to 
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policy statemenrO indicates that waiver is not necessarily a prerequisite for leniency-
which is ultimately a matter of prosecutorial discretion-the express indication that 
waiver might ever be considered has the potential to muddle incentives for 
organizational cooperation. 
Very few subjects seem to consume the white-collar defense bar more than the 
issue raised by the Holder and Thompson Memos: whether corporations should be 
required to waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product 
doctrine as a precondition to declination of prosecutorial or regulatory action against 
them. This is a question for the Department of Justice and other regulators, not 
sentencing authorities. However, the issue does spill over to sentencing in two 
respects. 
An organization's sentencing exposure may be significantly reduced as a result of 
credits awarded for compliance programs, self-reporting, cooperation at the 
investigative stage, and acceptance ofresponsibility.21 While effective compliance 
programs may significantly reduce fines, the reduction that accrues from self-
reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility can be nearly twice as great. 22 
Further, if the Justice Department concludes that the cooperation by an organizational 
defendant constitutes "substantial assistance," it may file a motion with the court 
requesting a "downward departure" from the minimum fine prescribed by the 
sentencing guidelines.23 Such a departure, which can only be granted upon 
Department of Justice motion, may be the best vehicle for obtaining reductions in 
liability because once a departure is granted, the judge is not bound by the guidelines 
and may significantly reduce--even to zero--the organization's penalty range. Thus, 
the questions the waiver controversy raises in the sentencing context are: if the 
Department of Justice proceeds with a criminal case and secures a conviction, may 
organizations be required to waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege or 
the work -product doctrine in order (1) to secure credit against their culpability score 
communications between specific officers, directors and employees and counsel. Such waivers permit 
the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to 
negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements. In addition, they are often critical in enabling 
the government to evaluate the completeness of a corporation's voluntary disclosure and cooperation. 
Prosecutors may, therefore, request a waiver in appropriate circumstances. The Department does not, 
however, consider waiver of a corporation's attorney-client and work product protection an absolute 
requirement, and prosecutors should consider the willingness of a corporation to waive such protection 
when necessary to provide timely and complete information as one factor in evaluating the corporation's 
cooperation."); see also Holder Memo, supra note 17, at 3, 6, 7; Thompson Memo, supra note IS, at 3, 6, 
7. 
20 Prepared by the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General, the United States Attorneys 
Manual ("USAM") is the primary policy document for federal prosecutors and controls in all cases where 
it conflicts with other Department of Justice policy statements (except statements directly made by the 
Attorney General). Title 9 of the manual sets policy for Criminal Division prosecutors, who oversee the 
enforcement of all federal criminal laws except those specifically assigned to other divisions. 
21 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ SC2.5(f), (g)(1)-{3) (2003). 
22 See id. § SAl.2, cmt. n. 3(k). 
23 See id. §§ SC4.1, SKl.1. 
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for organization cooperation under § 8C2.5(g); or (2) to obtain a "substantial 
assistance" departure under § 8C4.1? 
The existing Guidelines do not answer these questions. The only Guidelines 
provision to define cooperation, Application Note 12 to § 8C2.5(g), states that 
"cooperation must be both timely and thorough. ,,24 "Thorough" cooperation in tum 
means "disclosure of all pertinent information known by the organization.,,25 "A 
prime test of whether· the organization has disclosed all pertinent information is 
whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify the 
nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible for the criminal 
conduct.,,26 The Guidelines are silent, however, on the extent to which, if at all, 
waiver is a factor in obtaining credit for cooperation and substantial assistance at the 
sentencing phase. 
The Holder and Thompson Memos also do not explicitly answer these questions, 
although they certainly can be read to endorse the position that waiver should playa 
role in assessing sentencing culpability and fines, particularly with respect to a 
downward departure (whereby the government must first make a motion before the 
judge can deviate from the minimum punishment). And government prosecutors are 
likely to have a significant influence on a judge's determination of what constitutes an 
"effective program to prevent and detect violations of the law," whether an 
organization has "fully cooperated" in the investigation, or "clearly demonstrated 
recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct," as 
well as whether the organization's cooperation constitutes "substantial assistance" to 
investigators.27 
The question, then, for the Advisory Group was whether the application notes for 
cooperation under § 8C2.5(g) or substantial assistance departures under § 8C4.1 
should clarify that the waiver of existing legal privileges is not required. 
One striking-but perhaps unsurprising-fact to emerge from the Advisory 
Group's investigation of this issue was that the Department of Justice and the defense 
bar seem to be living in different worlds. Many defense counsel believe that "[t]he 
sound you hear coming from the corridors of the Department of Justice is a requiem 
marking the death of privilege in corporate criminal investigations. ,,28 Defense 
lawyers cite what they report to be regular governmental demands that corporations 
waive otherwise applicable privileges if they wish to avoid indictment or gain credit at 
sentencing for cooperating with the government as the principal impetus for the 
"death" of corporate privileges. The defense bar clearly believes that federal 
24 Id. § 8C2.5, cmt. fi. 12. 
25 Id. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. §§ 8C2.5(t), (g)(2)-{3); 8C4.1. 
28 David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of 
Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 147, 147 (2000); see also Lance 
Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege (And Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REv. 469 (2003). 
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prosecutors are, with increasing regularity, demanding that corporations waive the 
attorney-client privilege and work product protection as a condition of securing 
leniency in charging or at sentencing.29 According to defense practitioners, "[ w ]aiver 
of the privilege is now a routine part of discussing a corporate resolution" of a 
criminal investigation.30 Written submissions and oral testimony by members of the 
defense bar-many of them former prosecutors-supported this general concern that 
prosecutors are increasingly requiring, or at least very strongly suggesting, waivers as 
part of the cooperation process. 
The defense bar argued that the specter of routine requests for waiver necessarily 
has a chilling effect on internal investigations into allegations of organizational 
wrongdoing. The possibility that the government may require a waiver, and the fear 
of both the criminal and civil consequences of such a waiver, create a strong 
disincentive for companies to conduct thorough internal investigations, as well as for 
employees to cooperate in such investigations. A waiver to the government isa 
waiver to potential civil plaintiffs and other opposing parties as well, and companies 
are wary of providing a roadmap that will subject them to potentially crippling civil 
damages in addition to criminal penalties.31 Finally, counsel argued, the attorney-
client and work product privileges are critical tools for the defense attorney in the 
criminal justice process. Required waivers diminish the value of those tools, creating 
an imbalance in the process that strongly favors the prosecutor. 
Some defense counsel suggested that the Sentencing Guidelines' silence on this 
issue permits, if not encourages, the practice of requiring waivers, especially when 
combined with the dictates of the Holder and Thompson memos and the various 
interpretations accorded the memos by the different U.S. Attorneys' offices. They 
opined that this silence creates a danger that required waivers will become 
29 See Counsel Group Assails Prosecution Policy Compelling Corporations to Waive Privileges, 67 
CRIM. L. REp. 391 (June 14,2000) [hereinafter Counsel Group]. 
30 Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Melissa M. Longo, 'Waive' Goodbye to Attorney-Client Privilege, 7 No. 
9 Bus. CRIMES BULL. 1, 1 (2000). The Arthur Andersen case may present a cautionary tale. Some argue 
that "[u]nder most objective standards, [Arthur Andersen, LLP] did everything in its power to avoid a 
prosecution that it knew would be a 'death penalty' for the finn," except agree to waive the attomey-
client privilege. Laurence A. Urgenson, Jack S. Levin & Craig Primis, Attorney-Client Privilege: 
Surviving Corp. Fraud Scandal, 9 No.9 Bus'. CRIMES BULL. 1,6 (2002). Thus, Andersen reportedly 
notified the Justice Department and SEC immediately upon learning of the document destruction in its 
Houston office. Id. Andersen was also apparently willing to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement, 
"in essence a guilty plea, under which the government could have appointed a special monitor to oversee 
compliance with its new document retention policy and with other refonns to be approved by the DOJ." 
Id. Finally, Andersen also agreed to expel the individuals responsible for the document destruction and 
did, of course, fire the head of Andersen's auditing team for Enron (and the government's cooperating 
witness in Andersen's criminal trial), David Duncan. Id. at 6-7. Finally, Andersen "reportedly offered to 
pay as much as $750 million to Enron shareholders who had sued Andersen for its role in auditing 
Enron's books." Id. at 7. Despite these efforts, the Department of Justice decided to seek an indictment 
and ultimately secured a conviction of the partnership. 
31 See, e.g., Zomow & Krakaur, supra note 28, at 156-58; Counsel Group, supra note 29; Savage & 
Longo, supra note 30, at 1; Breckinridge L. Wilcox, Attorney/Client Privilege Waiver: Wrongheaded 
Practice?, 6 No. 12 Bus. CRIMES BULL. 1-, 1 (2000). 
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widespread, and that companies increasingly will be disinclined to self-police, self-
report, and cooperate, unless the Guidelines explicitly clarify the role of waivers in 
obtaining credit for cooperation. 
While the defense bar insisted that prosecutors' requests for privilege waivers are 
routine and comprehensive, the Department of Justice representatives were equally 
vehement in their assertions that blanket privilege waivers are not regularly demanded 
as a condition of corporate "cooperation," a position supported by the results of a 
survey conducted by the Advisory Group of U.S. Attorneys offices.32 In his testimony 
during the November 14, 2002 hearing, James Corney, then U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York and now Deputy Attorney General, said that any 
divergence from this policy-that is, any automatic requirement of waiver-stems 
from miscommunication inside the U.S. Attorneys' offices.33 
Further, Justice Department participants at the Advisory Group's November 2002 
hearing displayed a much more nuanced view of just when a waiver may be required 
for cooperation credit than many in the defense bar believe is normally employed by 
line prosecutors. At the time of the hearing, the Holder Memo controlled federal 
prosecutors' organizational charging decisions, and it was the topic of testimony by 
representatives of the Justice Department, including the Chief of the Criminal 
Division's Fraud Section and the U.S. Attorneys for the Southern District of New 
York and the Central District of California. In prepared remarks to the Advisory 
Group, the Justice Department representatives asserted that the waiver issue "has been 
clouded by a good deal ofrhetoric.,,34 They made the following points: 
1. "[I]f the facts can be fully disclosed without a waiver of any privileges, the 
Department of Justice in its policy does not require a waiver as a full measure of 
cooperation.,,35 While an organization must disclose the "full facts of the criminal 
activity" to earn credit for cooperation, there is no template for such disclosure.36 It 
can take a variety offorms, not all of which require waiver of privilege. For example, 
an organization can provide a detailed briefing, relevant documents and the results of 
witness interviews, or it can provide the government with, "a general briefing, identify 
the relevant witnesses, and [bring] them in for interviews to provide the government 
with an opportunity to find the detailed facts .... ,,37 Whether work product or other 
protections must be waived will depend on the nature and type of disclosure. The 
Justice Department representatives emphasized, however, that the organization must 
32 See Advisory Group Report, supra note 8, at 98-99. 
33 Transcript of Breakout Session IV, 21, 62--64 (Nov. 14,2002) [hereinafter Breakout Transcript] 
(statement of James Corney), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/phll_02IBRKOUT4.pdf. 
34 Written testimony of the United States Department of Justice Before the Ad Hoc Advisory Group 
on Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 11 (Nov. 14, 2002) [hereinafter DOJ Statement] (on file with 
author). 
35 Id. at 12. 
36 Id. at 10-11. 
37 Id. at 11. 
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disclose "precisely what [has] happened [and] who is responsible.,,38 The Department 
noted that corporations always have the option of refusing any waiver, but that there 
will be certain circumstances under which a waiver is necessary to receive the credit 
because a waiver is the only means by which the Department can obtain critical 
information.39 
2. The Justice Department distinguishes between work product protection and 
the traditional attorney-client privilege. As to the latter, "waiver of the core attorney-
client privilege-the advice given to clients-will rarely be necessary when a 
corporation is cooperating with the government.,,40 One such "rare exception," 
according to the Justice Department representatives, might arise where employees 
disregarded advice of counsel that a particular course of conduct would violate the 
law, in which case "successful prosecution of those employees may require 
government access to that advice of counsel.,,41 
In sum, consistent with the responses to the survey of U.S. Attorneys' offices, the 
Department of Justice's position was that its policy, as expressed in the Holder memo, 
does not require waivers of attorney-client privilege to obtain credit for cooperation. 
Further, it recommended that "the guidelines ... not be amended to provide that a 
waiver of privileges is not required in order to cooperate, precisely because in some 
situations the only way a corporation can cooperate, if it chooses to do so, is by 
waiving certain privileges.''''2 Jim Corney suggested that a flat prohibition on requests 
for waiver would not serve the public interest in pursuing wrongdoing because it 
would allow organizations to raise the Guidelines as a shield when prosecutors believe 
they are not doing enough to cooperate.43 
Presumably, both the defense community and the government would agree that 
there are narrow circumstances-such as those described by the Department of Justice 
representatives at the November 2002 Hearing-when law enforcement interests 
justify Justice Department requests for privilege waivers. There are also obviously 
circumstances in which an organizational defendant will conclude that it is in its best 
interest to waive the protections of the work product doctrine and the attorney-client 
privilege. Both sides may also agree that the attorney-client and work product 
protections serve an important function and that requests for organizational waivers, if 
they are made routinely, will reach a point where they have counterproductive 
consequences, i.e., actually discouraging effective compliance programs, thorough 
internal investigations and self-reporting. 
The issues as to which there seems to be continuing (and sometimes heated) 
debate are (I) just how common requests for organizational waivers are, i. e., whether 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 11-12. 
40 Id. at 12. 
41 !d. 
42 Id. at 13. 
43 See Breakout Transcript, supra note 33, at 22-23. 
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this tipping point has been reached or exceeded; and (2) the value of adding a 
statement in the Guidelines that would clarify the role of waivers in obtaining credit 
for cooperation. It should be noted, however, that even if the DOJ is correct that 
waivers are not routinely requested, perceptions in this context may be more important 
than reality. That is, if the defense bar is firmly convinced that requests for 
organizational waivers are now commonplace, this perception may well lead to legal 
advice grounded on that conviction and the adverse consequences feared, whether or 
not the defense's perception is empirically valid. 
The Advisory Committee finally determined to recommend that the Sentencing 
Commission add language to the application notes for cooperation under § 8C2.5(g) 
and substantial assistance departures under § 8C4.1, which states that "[i]f the 
defendant has satisfied the requirements for" cooperation or substantial assistance set 
forth in the application notes, "waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work 
product protections is not a prerequisite" to a reduction in culpability score for 
cooperation or to a motion for a downward departure.44 Both proposed application 
notes go on to caution: "However, in some circumstances, waiver of the attorney-
client privilege and of work product protections may be required in order to satisfy the 
requirements of cooperation.,,45 
This language was very carefully negotiated. My concern about the suggested 
language is that some might read these application notes as invitations to demand 
waivers rather than as what they are-attempts to ensure that waivers are not 
demanded in every case as a condition for cooperation or substantial assistance credit. 
My reading may seem paranoid, but the Holder and Thompson Memos-which carry 
a similar message-have been widely misread as encouraging privilege waivers and 
have resulted in many more waiver requests than were made when the Justice 
Department had no articulated policy on privilege waivers in corporate charging. If 
those Memos, which simply note that on occasion a privilege waiver may be 
requested as is necessary to corporate cooperation, have created unintended problems, 
so too may this language. I take comfort, however, in the fact that the Advisory 
Group's report should make it clear that the objective here is to restrict requests for 
waiver to situations in which cooperation truly demands them, not to give the green 
light for routine waiver requests.46 
The Department of Justice presumably accepted this language, as its 
representative did not protest this section or dissent from the report. It may be 
significant, however, that the only change in AGOG's suggested amendments that the 
Sentencing Commission made in publishing the amendments in the Federal Register 
for public comment (or at least the only one that I could find) was the bracketing of 
this language in the proposed application note to the substantial assistance departure. 
44 Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 8C2.5, emt. n. 12; id. § 8C4.1, emt. n. 2. 
45 Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 8C2.5, emt. n. 12; id. § 8C4.1, emt. n. 2. 
46 See. e.g., Advisory Group Report, supra note 8, at 92-104. 
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I assume that the brackets are the product of belated Justice Department objections 
and wonder what the fate of this hard-fought Advisory Group compromise will 
ultimately be. 
What does all this have to do with the theme I initially promised to discuss? 
Without in any way denigrating the efforts that members of our group made to tackle 
the question of privilege waivers, it seems to me that this issue in the sentencing 
context is something of a sideshow. It therefore illustrates the limits of the Sentencing 
Commission's power directly to affect policies which may have important 
consequences for compliance incentives-and thus for the success of chapter 8. The 
real action is in the determinations made by the Department of Justice at the charging 
or declination stage, when most of the waiver requests will be made. If the case is 
declined, these sentencing questions do not arise. If the waiver is given but the 
organization is charged, the waiver is a done deal, and so pressure to make the waiver 
cannot be attributed to these guidelines provisions. It is only in cases in which the 
organization declines to waive and the government proceeds against it to conviction 
that the issue may arise as to whether the corporation can be asked to waive its 
privileges as a requisite to securing credit for cooperation or a downward departure. I 
do not know as an empirical matter just how many of these cases there are, but I 
would assume that their numbers are insignificant in comparison to the number of 
organizations who must face this waiver issue when dealing with the Department of 
Justice before charging, convicting, or sentencing. Thus, the Sentencing 
Commission's ability to have a significant influence on the waiver issue seems to me 
very limited. To the extent that a message is sent by these proposed amendments, it 
may be simply to increase the visibility of the forced waiver issue and perhaps 
persuade the Department of Justice to try a little harder to ensure that its prosecutors 
understand and comply with the Holder and Thompson Memos. 
B. Legislative Default: The Alternative Minimum Fine Provision 
In the course of its investigation and deliberations, the Advisory Group ran into a 
number of issues that could not be resolved by the Sentencing Commission, requiring 
instead legislative "fixes." Indeed, what struck me in the course of our deliberations 
was how many of the seemingly obvious problems required the attention of Congress. 
It was in fact somewhat frustrating to some of us-and I assume is a daily trial to the 
Sentencing Commission-that the Sentencing Commission's ability to address these 
problems is restricted to its power to study issues and make statutory amendment 
recommendations to Congress,47 and Congress does not always seem interested in 
responding. This was certainly evident in our investigation: despite the fact that many 
problems were not new-and indeed some have dogged the organizational guidelines 
47 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(20) (2000), the Sentencing Commission has the power to "make 
recommendations to Congress concerning modification or enactment of statutes relating to sentencing, 
penal, and correctional matters that the Commission finds to be necessary and advisable to cany out an 
effective, humane and rational sentencing policy." 
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from their birth-Congress has done nothing to address them. Among these is one 
that may indicate that Congress simply does not understand that this very convenient 
delegee of difficult questions-the Sentencing Commission--cannot alone remedy all 
that which needs to be fixed. This issue concerns the statutory limit on fines that can 
be imposed in guidelines cases. 
Under the alternative fine provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3571, the statutory maximum 
for a given count is the greatest of (1) the amount (if any) specified in the law setting 
forth the offense; (2) for an organization convicted of a felony, $500,000; or (3) "[i]f 
any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in 
pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not 
more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless the 
imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process. ,.48 This last provision, known as the twice gross gain or loss 
provision, is likely to be the applicable figure in many cases, especially where the 
dollar amount of the gain or loss is great. 
Section § 3571, as presently drafted, has the perverse effect of requiring 
sentencing judges to impose a fine at the lowest point of the fine range computed 
under the organizational guidelines when sentencing the most culpable organizational 
offenders. Reference to the culpability multipliers demonstrates that the Sentencing 
Commission determined that those organizational offenders with the highest 
culpability scores (ten and over) should be sentenced to up to four times the base fine 
amount (the "base fine" is often equivalent to the gross gain or loss).49 Indeed, every 
organizational offender who receives a culpability score over five (which is the score 
with which all organizational defendants start when a culpability score is calculated) 
will have a maximum multiplier of over two and thus, not infrequently, a Guidelines 
fine range that exceeds at its upper reaches the statutory maximum of twice the gross 
gain or loss. The effect of this can be to render Guidelines' culpability factors 
irrelevant. 
For example, assume two corporations cause the same amount ofloss, that loss is 
determined to constitute the base fine amount under § 8C2.4, and both corporations 
would otherwise have a culpability score of eight. However, one organization has put 
in place an effective compliance program and thus has a score of five (taking into 
account the three-point "effective program" credit), while the other has not. Because 
of the operation of § 3571, both corporations will have the same maximum fine-
twice the loss--despite the disparity in their compliance efforts, at least where only 
one count is charged and no departures are made. The limitation imposed by § 3571, 
then, defeats much of what the Sentencing Commission sought to achieve in 
measuring organizational "just deserts" through the culpability score. And the 
Commission cannot change that fact without the active assistance of Congress. 
Further, § 3571 suffers from an ambiguity in drafting that may be best illustrated 
by example. Assume that the defendant organization pleads guilty to one count of 
48 See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2000). 
49 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.6 (2003). 
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mail fraud, to which perhaps $1 million in losses may be attributed, but the entire 
fraudulent scheme reflected in part in that count caused losses of up to $10 million. Is 
the statutory maximum twice the gross loss from the offense of conviction-$2 
million-or is it twice the gross loss attributable to all the criminal conduct at issue-
$20 million? The alternative fine provision simply states that the statutory maximum 
may be twice the gross gain or loss caused by "the offense." Although the better 
reading appears to be that "the offense" is the offense of conviction,50 this is by no 
means clear. 
The Advisory Group did not recommend a specific statutory fix, but rather 
simply suggested that the Sentencing Commission, together with other interested 
parties, examine whether § 3571 's cap of twice the gross gain or loss "creates 
disproportional, unfair, and counterproductive sentencing results where organizations' 
culpability scores are in the upper ranges.,,51 Were Congress truly aware of its 
nondelegable responsibilities in relation to corporate sentencing, this would seem to 
have been a problem that those recently focusing on corporate criminal accountability 
might have attended to. Yet, my research assistant was unable to find any proposals 
to amend § 3571 in the flurry of legislative proposals that grew out of the 2002 
scandals and that eventuated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.52 If this essay has 
any effect at all, I hope it is to spur congressional interest in the tasks it must 
undertake to enhance corporate compliance efforts, address this problem and, more 
important, consider the issues posed by the "litigation dilemma," to which I will now 
tum. 
C. Legis/ative Default: The Litigation Dilemma 
Logically enough, the Advisory Group began its investigation by trying to assess 
the impact of the organizational guidelines, detennining whether they have been a 
success in promoting organization compliance with the law, and isolating those 
portions of the guidelines that might require closer attention. For the reasons laid out 
at length in the Advisory Group's Report,53 AGOG concluded that the organizational 
50 The legislative history is unilluminating on this issue. See H.R. REp. No. 100-390, at 1-6 (1987); 
H.R. REp. No. 98-906, at 1-4 (1984). The better reading, however, seems to be that "the offense" refers 
only to the offense of conviction and not to the entire course of criminal conduct. This certainly seems to 
have been the Sentencing Commission's understanding of the term. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 
SUPPLEMENTARY REpORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZA nONS 11-12 (Aug. 30, 1991). This 
reading is also consistent with the results courts have reached in reading the analogous restitution 
provisions of 18 U.S.c. § 3663 (2000). See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 412 (1990) 
(predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 3663 linked restitution to the offense of conviction); United States v. 
Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 137 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074,1077 (9th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Mancillas, 172 F.3d 341,343 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Davis, 170 F.3d 617,627 
(6th Cir. 1999). 
51 Advisory Group Report, supra note 8, at 135. 
52 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
53 Advisory Group Report, supra note 8, at 25-35. 
HeinOnline -- 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 503 2003-2004
2004] PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES 503 
guidelines must be counted as a success to the extent that the objective was to induce 
many organizations-directly and indirectly through incentives created by other, 
guidelines-influenced governmental actors-to focus on compliance and to create 
programs to prevent and detect violations of law. The Advisory Group also 
concluded, however, that the organizational guidelines' success was not unqualified. 
AGOG suggested that compliance incentives could be improved, although some of the 
most important means of doing so require further study by the Commission and, if the 
Commission and Congress deem it appropriate, legislative action. 
It is obviously difficult to empirically test whether the organizational guidelines' 
success in raising corporate America's consciousness about the importance of 
compliance programs has translated into the actual prevention or deterrence of 
organizational crime. In particular, it is difficult to know whether the widespread 
movement to adopt compliance programs has resulted in the institution of effective 
compliance programs. Indeed, there is substantial evidence demonstrating that, as 
strong as the guidelines' and guidelines-influenced compliance incentives are, there 
are countervailing, and in some instances equally weighty, incentives to create 
ineffective compliance programs. 
Specifically, the institution of truly effective programs-the auditing and 
monitoring that those programs require, and the training and internal reporting 
systems those programs contemplate-all create a real risk that information flowing 
from these admirable practices will be used by governmental actors or third parties to 
harm the organization, most often in litigation. This is referred to as the "litigation 
dilemma," which over the entire life of the organizational guidelines has been 
recognized as one of the greatest impediments to the creation of truly effective 
compliance programs. 54 As noted, the litigation dilemma affects organizational 
incentives with respect to training, auditing, and monitoring, internal reporting, and 
cooperation and self-reporting; all of these critical aspects of a vigorous and effective 
compliance system can be compromised or rendered entirely worthless by persons 
more concerned about litigation exposure than the statistically less likely event of 
criminal prosecution. 
The litigation dilemma loomed large in the Advisory Group's investigations and 
discussions. If many industry representatives are to be credited, removing the 
impediments created by the litigation dilemma would be the single most important 
step that the Commission could take to promote effective compliance efforts. Indeed, 
some would argue that many if not most of the enhancements the Advisory Group 
recommended (e.g., in training, monitoring, and auditing) will only be successful if 
organizations are able to implement them without fear that such innovations will not 
come back to bite them. But ultimately the Commission does not have the power to 
solve this problem, for example, by creating a selective privilege waiver or a self-
evaluative privilege; in the end, only Congress can remove this stumbling block to 
truly effective programs and thus to Chapter 8' s success. 
54 See id. at 121-25. 
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The Advisory Group did not arrive at a specific recommended resolution of the 
"litigation dilemma" for the consideration of the Sentencing Commission and, 
ultimately, Congress. This is a very complex issue which requires the input of 
constituencies from which we did not hear (e.g., the plaintiffs bar).55 Further, a 
number of proposed "fixes" have been identified, but which, if any, merit 
implementation in legislation requires a great deal of study. That said, the litigation 
dilemma has haunted the organizational guidelines since their inception, and it creates 
a potentially significant disincentive for the implementation of truly effective 
programs. If the Sentencing Commission and Congress are serious about promoting a 
real crime-fighting partnership with corporate America and encouraging effective 
compliance programs in aid of that partnership, they will take AGOG up on its strong 
recommendation that the litigation dilemma requires and deserves greater study. If 
nothing else comes of AGOG's Report, I hope this recommendation will bear fruit 
because I remain convinced that it may ultimately be more important to effective 
compliance than the textual changes proposed in the new § 8B2.1. 
D. The Sentencing Commission's Mission in its "Effective Program" Definition 
Obviously, much of the Advisory Group's work and suggestions focus on the 
definition of an effective program. In studying what could be done to ensure that 
organizations would put in place effective compliance systems, the Advisory Group's 
review suggested that a number of refinements to the definition of an effective 
program would be advisable. These refinements were intended to eliminate problems 
revealed by ten years of sentencing experience. It was also hoped that they would 
better describe those essential attributes of successful compliance programs revealed 
by ten years of program development and testing. 
A number of the changes AGOG proposed simply make explicit that which was 
assumed in the existing definition. For example, the proposed § 8B2.I(c) provides 
that, in creating a program that meets the seven minimum requisites in § 8B2.1(b), 
"the organization shall conduct ongoing risk assessment and take appropriate steps to 
design, implement, or modify each step set forth in subsection (b) to reduce the risk of 
violations of law identified by the risk assessment.,,56 One would assume that 
appropriate risk assessments are a part of any effective program, but it seemed wise to 
make this requirement-and its applicability to each of the seven criteria--explicit. 
Another example would be the provision of a definition of "compliance standards and 
procedures" to mean "standards of conduct and internal control systems that are 
55 It also strikes me that the potential unintended consequences of a selective privilege waiver may 
counsel that those parties who are urging some action with respect to the "litigation dilemma"-potential 
organizational defendants-may want to be careful what they wish for. Were Congress to create some 
type of selective waiver doctrine, for example, whereby organizations could produce privileged materials 
to federal prosecutors without risking a broader waiver, they would no longer be able to claim this 
dilemma as a reason to decline waivers or other types of cooperation with the government or as an excuse 
for less than vigorous compliance programs. 
56 Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note S, § SB2.I(c). 
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reasonably capable of reducing the likelihood of violations of law. ,,57 
The Advisory Group also attempted to cure textual ambiguities or deficiencies. 
A case-in-point was our effort to make sense of one of the guidelines' existing criteria 
for an "effective program" that has provoked a great deal of confusion and criticism: 
"The organization must have used due care not to delegate substantial discretionary 
authority to individuals whom the organization knew, or should have known through 
the exercise of due diligence, had a propensity to engage in illegal activities. ,,58 We 
thought that the original intent underlying this section was better captured in the 
following proposed language: "The organization shall use reasonable efforts not to 
include within the substantial authority personnel of the organization any individual 
whom the organization knew, or should have known through the exercise of due 
diligence, has a history of engaging in violations oflaw or other conduct inconsistent 
with an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.,,59 
Some of the suggested clarifications require more from compliance programs but 
would seem to be relatively uncontroversial changes given advances in the 
compliance field. Two such proposed revisions take steps that are now listed as 
examples of what might satisfy one of the seven general criteria and make the steps 
set forth in the examples mandatory. Thus, one of the existing criteria requires that 
the "organization must have taken steps to communicate effectively its standards and 
procedures to all employees and other agents" and lists (in the disjunctive) the 
examples of requiring training programs or disseminating publications that explain in 
a practical matter what is required. Our proposed revision requires that the 
organization take reasonable steps to communicate in a practical manner its 
compliance standards and procedures and other aspects of its program to all "members 
of the governing authority, the organizational leadership, the organization's 
employees, and, as appropriate, the organization's agents" by conducting effective 
training programs and otherwise disseminating information, appropriate to the 
recipients' respective roles and responsibilities. 
Similarly, one of the criteria presently in the definition requires that the 
"organization must have taken reasonable steps to achieve compliance with its 
standards," and suggests as an example that an organization may pursue this aim "by 
utilizing monitoring and auditing systems reasonably designed to detect criminal 
conduct by its employees and other agents and by having in place and publicizing a 
reporting system whereby employees and other agents could report criminal conduct 
by others within the organization without fear of retribution.,,60 The Advisory 
Committee determined, based on its review, that an organization could not effectively 
ensure that its program was followed without using some monitoring and auditing 
systems designed to detect violations oflaw. Accordingly, AGOG recommended that 
this be converted from a suggestion to a requirement. The Advisory Committee 
57 Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8B2.1, cmt. n. 1. 
58 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt. n. 3(k)(3) (emphasis added). 
59 Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8B2.1(b)(3). 
60 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt. n. 3(k)(5). 
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further concluded that organizations had to "evaluate periodically the effectiveness of 
the organization's program,,61 in order to be able to show that, despite the wrongdoing 
for which it had been convicted, the organization had in place an "effective" program. 
A "paper" program, drafted to satisfy regulatory or guidelines criteria but left to 
gather dust in desk drawers, simply will not suffice. Finally, the proposed guideline 
now broadens the reporting requirement to include the creation of a system that 
provides guidance as well as permits reporting without retribution, and to specify that 
organizations include in their reporting system some mechanism for anonymous 
. 62 
reportmg. 
I would assume that the above revisions should not be terribly controversial from 
a compliance point of view but may provoke opposition from those who believe that 
the guidelines should maintain the highest possible level of generality or who are 
concerned that the criteria will become unduly expensive or burdensome, particularly 
for small organizations. A response to both concerns is that these criteria, while 
slightly more specific, in fact are flexible and should be crafted to fit the size and 
nature of the business as well as the type and likelihood oflegal risk the organization 
is likely to encounter. 63 
The proposal that may garner the most attention but which, to me at least, seemed 
a no-brainer, is § 8B2.l(b)(2)'s attempt to set forth in general terms the 
responsibilities of the organization's leadership and governing authority in 
constructing and maintaining an effective compliance program. The existing 
definition provides no guidance on the role of organizational leadership or boards of 
directors in the creation and supervision of an effective program. Under the proposed 
standard, "organizationalleadership,,64 must be "knowledgeable about the content and 
operation of the program.,,65 The organization's board of directors or other 
"governing authority,,66 must be "knowledgeable about the content and operation of 
61 Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8B2.1(b)(S)(B) (emphasis added). 
62 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(S)(C). 
63 See id. § 8B2.1, cmt. n. 2. 
64 "Organizational leadership" means "(A) high-level personnel of the organization; (B) high-level 
personnel of a unit of the organization; and (C) substantial authority personnel." Proposed U.S.S.G., 
supra note 8, § 8B2.1, cmt. n. I; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8AI.2 (defming 
"high-level personnel of the organization" and "substantial authority personnel"); 8C2.S (defining "high-
level personnel of a unit of the organization"). "Collectively, these parties represent the key decision 
makers within organization management-the range of leaders who set directions for organizational 
actions and who determine when organizational performance is successful in attaining organizational 
goals." Advisory Group Report, supra note 8, at 61. 
65 Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8B2.I(b)(2). 
66 The "governing authority" of an organization is "(A) the Board of Directors, or (B) if the 
organization does not have a Board of Directors, the highest-level governing body of the organization." 
Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8B2.1, cmt. n. 1. 
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the program" and must "exercise reasonable oversight with respect to the 
implementation and effectiveness of the program to prevent and detect violations of 
law.,,67 
Compliance experts seem to be unanimous in the belief that unless the proper 
tone is set at the top--that is, unless the organizational leadership makes clear that 
compliance with the law is an organizational priority-no compliance program is 
likely to succeed. Specifying the role of the organizational leadership had accordingly 
become standard practice even before the recent corporate scandals broke. 68 This 
development is consistent with the views the Delaware Chancery Court expressed in 
Caremark regarding officers' and directors' duties to become informed about 
compliance reporting systems in order to reach informed decisions about 
organizational compliance with law.69 Finally, the Advisory Group concluded that: 
the current total silence in the organizational sentencing guidelines 
relating to the role of the governing authority fails to state what 
may otherwise be obvious: ultimately the governing authority is 
responsible for the activities of the organization. It can only 
perform this function if its members are actively involved in 
compliance reviews and reasonably educated about the business of 
the organization and the legal and fiduciary duties of governing 
authority members.70 
I expect that other Advisory Group's proposals concerning an "effective 
program" will generate more controversy. Among these are proposals that I believe 
may raise interesting conceptual questions regarding the Sentencing Commission's 
mission in drafting these guidelines. Three examples should suffice to illustrate the 
point: 
1. The Commission now defines an "effective program to prevent and detect 
violations oflaw" as a "program that has been reasonably designed, implemented, and 
enforced so that it generally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal 
conduct.,,7! At a minimum, the guidelines state, effective compliance programs 
require that organizations exercise "due diligence in seeking to prevent and detect 
criminal conduct by [their] employees and other agents."n The seven criteria, some 
of which are explored above, then define the minimum steps an organization must 
take to demonstrate such "due diligence." The Advisory Group has recommended 
revising this in a potentially significant way to require that organizations demonstrate 
67 Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 8B2.1(b)(2). 
68 See AdVisory Group Report, supra note 8, at 59. 
69 See supra note 16. 
70 Advisory Group Report, supra note 8, at 58. 
71 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt. n. 3(k). 
72 !d. 
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something beyond "due diligence." Thus, the proposed § 8B2.1 (c) states that to have 
an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law," an organization shall 
"exercise due diligence to prevent and detect violations of law" and "otherwise 
promote an organizational culture that encourages a commitment to compliance with 
the law.,,73 It is important to note, however, that this does not necessarily require 
assessments of an organization's "culture" in each case. The proposed § 8B2.1(b) 
provides that if organizations satisfy the seven minimum criteria listed in that section, 
they will have demonstrated "[ d]ue diligence and the promotion of an organizational 
culture that encourages commitment to compliance with the law within the meaning 
of subsection (a).,,74 
2. The "effective program" definition now does not address areas of great 
concern to those with experience in corporate compliance: ensuring that the 
organization provides adequate resources to compliance systems, and giving 
individuals with responsibility for the program the ability to report directly to the 
governing authority or a subgroup of that authority where necessary. The 
amendments proposed by the Advisory Group make these criteria part of the 
definition of an "effective program.,,75 
3. The definition as it now stands (and indeed all of Chapter 8) focuses on 
preventing and detecting "criminal conduct,,,76 and the seven steps concern those 
actions necessary to make sure that the compliance standards and procedures are 
reasonably capable of reducing "criminal conduct." The proposed definition replaces 
references to "criminal conduct" with the more general "violations of law," and the 
application notes make clear that "violations oflaw" is intended to mean "violations 
of any law, whether criminal or noncriminal (including a regulation), for which the 
organization is, or would be, liable.,,77 
Some might argue that if the Sentencing Commission adopts these suggestions it 
will have exceeded its mandate-which authorizes the Commission only to set rules 
for assessing organizational culpability in the criminal sentencing context. No doubt 
arguments will be made that these amendments cross the line between the appropriate 
policing of compliance directed to deterring criminal conduct and the ultra vires 
setting of general standards for compliance with any and all legal requirements (and 
which unduly interfere with business prerogatives). Specifically, some may question 
whether the Sentencing Commission should be in the business of deciding, or inviting 
prosecutors and sentencing judges to decide: whether organizations have devoted 
adequate resources to compliance efforts; to whom compliance officers should report 
or have access; and whether an organization has fostered a qualifying organizational 
"culture" of compliance. 
To explain this point, I will quote at length from one of the responses we 
73 Proposed V.S.S.G., supra note S, § S82.1(a) (emphasis added). 
74 [d. § S82.1(b) (emphasis added). 
75 [d. § SB2.1(b)(2). 
76 [d. 
77 Proposed V.S.S.G., supra note S, § S82.1, cmt. n. 1; see also id., cmt. n. 4(A). 
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received to a proposal that was ultimately not reflected in the Advisory Group's final 
draft, but which involved a proposed criterion that drew many of the same objections 
that will likely be made to the above amendments and, in particular, to the 
requirement relating to organizational compliance "culture." When the Advisory 
Group issued its second request for public comment, one of the questions we posed 
was: 
Should Chapter Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines encourage 
organizations to foster ethical cultures to ensure compliance with 
the intent of regulatory schemes as opposed to technical 
compliance that can potentially circumvent the purpose of the law 
or regulation? If so, how would an organization's performance in 
this regard be measured or evaluated? How would that be 
incorporated into the structure of Chapter Eight? 
Although not alone in asserting that the guidelines "should continue to be 
understood and evaluated in the criminal sentencing context-that is, the jurisdictional 
scope of the Sentencing Commission-and should not be expanded to address more 
general ethical issues,,,78 an October 11, 2002 submission by David T. Buente of 
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P. on behalf of the American Chemistry Council 
perhaps stated the objection best-and thus I shall borrow liberally from that 
submission as follows: 
[T]he role of the Organizational Guidelines is to address the 
specific issue of criminal noncompliance with legal requirements 
and not to expand into general issues of corporate social 
responsibility or ethics that are not directly regulated by criminal 
law. 
Some of the suggestions raised in the comments submitted to the 
Commission in response to the Federal Register notice that led to 
the formation of the Advisory Group would have the Commission 
expand its charter beyond its authority to address violations of 
crirninallaw. For example, requiring an "integrity and ethics based 
system," however admirable, is not necessarily related to 
preventing, detecting or reporting criminal conduct. . .. Criminal 
conduct is defined in a discrete set of federal statutes. Individuals 
and organizations are convicted and sentenced because of specific 
violations of specific statutory provisions. They are not convicted 
78 Letter from David T. Buente, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., on behalf of the American 
Chemistry Council, to B. Todd Jones, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission's Advisory Group on the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations regarding the August 21, 2002 Request for Public Comment 
(Oct. 11,2002) (on file with the author). 
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or sentenced because they may in some manner be unethical or lack 
integrity-even if that is the case. 
The focus of the Commission should remain on systems that assure 
compliance with legal requirements, not ethics programs that focus 
on important questions in a wider domain. This is particularly true 
given that, unlike the defined realm of criminal offenses, there is no 
agreed-upon set of ethical criteria against which organizations can 
be measured. Encouraging organizations to create an "ethics 
infrastructure" that goes beyond compliance with criminal law is a 
laudable goal. However, the presence or absence of such an ethical 
infrastructure should not have consequences in the very serious 
context of sentencing those convicted of crimes .... 
The Organizational Guidelines are used by courts to sentence those 
convicted of crimes. Therefore, proposed changes to the 
Organizational Guidelines should always be assessed in terms of 
how they would be used in the very serious context of sentencing in 
a court oflaw. However, almost all of the comments submitted to 
the Commission thus far treat the Organizational Guidelines as a 
guidance manual or educational tool on how to implement effective 
compliance systems, and do not discuss how these changes would 
be implemented in the sentencing context. ... 
In the 10+ years since they were first issued, the Organizational 
Guidelines have clearly taken on a significant secondary role as an 
inspiration and template for the development of effective corporate 
compliance programs. These programs in turn have frequently 
grown into, or been merged with, more general programs designed 
to foster ethical behavior and that extend beyond notions of law-
abidance. 
This is a good development, whether or not foreseen by Congress 
or the Commission. But it is not the function that Congress or the 
Commission intended the Organizational Guidelines to 
accomplish. Nor should the Organizational Guidelines be 
expanded now to encompass these broader but ultimately irrelevant 
purposes. It is a happy development that the Organizational 
Guidelines are being integrated with aspirational ethics programs. 
It would be wrong, however, for organizations now to be punished 
more severely for not having taken these "leading," "best practice" 
steps[.] The threat of increased criminal penalties should not be 
used to "encourage" organizations to upgrade their compliance 
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assurance systems into "ethics programs.,,79 
When I first read this letter, it resonated with me. As a former defense lawyer 
and prosecutor, I was concerned that it would be difficult ifnot impossible to expect 
participants in the day-to-day realities of criminal sentencing to arrive at objective, 
fair, and uniform assessments of whether a corporation's compliance program was 
sufficiently imbued with the proper "ethics" or "values." Further, this letter and 
others forced me to question what the Sentencing Commission's appropriate role was 
in these circumstances-beyond the narrow question of whether "ethics" or "values"-
based programs ought to be mandated. That is, shouldn't the Commission confine its 
attention to making judgments regarding organizations' criminal culpability and leave 
the formulation of "best practices" to the organizations themselves? 
After a great deal of reflection and discussion, however, I came to the conclusion 
that some attention had to be paid to the organization's compliance "culture" (a 
concept potentially as indeterminate as "ethics"). The basis for that decision is 
explained at some length in the Advisory Group's Report80 and I will not repeat it 
here. More important, I decided that the Sentencing Commission's obligation to 
create a criminal sentencing regime for organizations actually requires the 
Commission-given the purposes of punishment in the organizational context-to 
create precisely that which Mr. Buente objects to: a "guidance manual" (albeit a fairly 
generally worded and flexible "guidance manual") that outlines those practices or 
structures which experience demonstrates are necessary to an "effective" system to 
prevent and detect violations of law. 
While this conclusion may warrant more extended treatment, let me briefly 
summarize my reasons for adopting this view of the Sentencing Commission's role 
and obligations with respect to the delineation of what constitutes an "effective 
program." Most commentators appear to believe that deterrence is the foremost, if not 
the only, legitimate aim of corporate criminal liability.81 In traditional terms, 
deterrence theory presupposes that the credible threat of sanctions will discourage 
rational actors from engaging in illegal or unethical conduct ("negative deterrence"). 
This negative deterrent calculus is said to be a function of the likelihood that the 
sanction will be imposed and the costs associated with the sanction: 
79 Id. at 3-4. 
80 See Advisory Group Report, supra note 8, at 50-55. 
81 See, e.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 
109 HARV. L. REv. 1477, 1494 & nn.91-93 (1996) (collecting authorities); Julie Rose O'Sullivan, 
Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. lL. 
ETHICS 1,40 & n.160 (2002); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and 
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. LJ. 1559, 1573 (1990) 
("[T]he most commonly accepted basis for corporate crirninalliability is the need to deter misconduct."); 
Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal 
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1235 (J979)("Injustifying the imposition of criminal sanctions for 
illicit corporate activity, commentators most often cite deterrence as the primary rationale."). 
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Economists generally agree that an actor who. contemplates 
committing a crime . will be deterred only if the "expected 
punishment cost" of a proscribed action exceeds the expected gain. 
This concept of the expected punishment cost involves more than 
simply the amount of the penalty. Rather, the expected penalty 
must be discounted by the likelihood of apprehension and 
conviction in order to. yield the expected punishment cost. 82 
When deterrence is designed to affect the conduct of entities, however, this formula 
must take into account the fact that deterrence in this context must have a catalyzing 
as well as inhibiting function ("catalyzing deterrence"). As Brent Fisse explains in the 
corporate crime context: 
[O]rganizational offenders cannot exert self-control merely by 
individual self-denial. Self-denial on offenders' parts must be 
embodied in corporate policy and backed by appropriate 
disciplinary measures and organizational procedures. Accordingly, 
under a scheme of corporate deterrence, punishment or a threat of 
punishment requires corporations to do more than merely exercise 
inhibition and self-restraint; they are expected to institute effective 
crime prevention policies, disciplinary controls and changes in 
standard operating procedures. 83 
Indeed, the sweep of this catalyzing theory potentially includes incapacitative 
and rehabilitative goals which may be difficult to fit into a corporate liability theory. 
As Brent Fisse argues "[p ]olicy revision, internal disciplinary control, and procedural 
action-the forms of rehabilitation and incapacitation that are most practical and 
useful in preventing corporate crime-are subgoals of [catalyzing] deterrence. ,,84 In 
short, the catalyzing theory of deterrence provides that the ultimate purpose of 
organizational criminal sanctioning is to galvanize organizations to put in place 
policies, and to reform organizational cultures, such that future criminal harms will be 
avoided. 
The Sentencing Commission is charged with promulgating "detailed guidelines 
prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes. ,,85 In 
so doing, it must "further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, 
incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. ,,86 The organizational guidelines, 
82 John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the 
Problem o/Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386,389 (1981). 
83 Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and 
Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141, 1160 (1983). 
84 Id. at 1159. 
85 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2003). 
86 Id. 
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in particular, are "designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their 
agents, taken together, will provide just punishment,. adequate deterrence, and 
incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, 
detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.,,87 Given the above explanation of what 
deterrence requires in the corporate context, it seems to me that the last two objectives 
articulated by the Commission are in fact redundant. That is, "adequate deterrence" 
requires that the Commission create "incentives for organizations to maintain internal 
mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct. ,,88 
The organizational guidelines structure incentives and penalties so as to serve the 
goal of galvanizing deterrence. That is, the guidelines attempt to induce organizations 
to put in place an "effective" compliance system that will prevent future corporate 
criminality. To secure the full benefits of galvanizing deterrence, it would seem fairly 
evident that where the Sentencing Commission can give organizations assistance in 
creating these systems, it should do so to further its deterrent aims and to provide fair 
notice of what will be tested at criminal sentencing. The Sentencing Commission, 
then, ought to identify-without being overprescriptive but with sufficient specificity 
to be helpful-those steps that the evidence demonstrates will be effective to prevent 
future misconduct. This is appropriate even where the steps may seem invasive from 
a corporate perspective or may appear to wander into areas (e.g., "ethics," "culture") 
that are traditionally not the subject of assessment at criminal sentencing. Recall that 
these steps are not legally mandatory; rather, they simply provide notice of what the 
Commission believes is necessary to demonstrate good faith efforts to prevent and 
detect organizational crime. 
It is not only appropriate for the guidelines to provide a checklist of "best 
practices" to assist in the formulation of those programs, it is also arguably imperative 
in the context of criminal sentencing. The societal interest in galvanizing 
organizations to take effective steps to prevent criminal harms is obviously great; this 
interest is most efficiently and reliably met by the provision of expert, up-front 
guidance regarding the ingredients of "effective" compliance. Further, due process 
"notice" concerns, as well the organizational interest in knowing with some amount of 
specificity that which will help them avoid potentially crippling criminal penalties, 
also argue for the Sentencing Manual to set forth, at least in general terms, a 
compliance "guidance manual." Finally, advance articulation of those steps necessary 
to "effective" compliance will serve to guide the discretion of prosecutors, probation 
officers, and judges. Absent such guidance, these actors-who rarely can be relied 
upon to have expertise in corporate management or compliance-are left at sea, to 
make potentially subjective and erroneous assessments of whether corporate 
compliance efforts are "effective." 
There may be a variety of practical reasons why some types of criteria may be 
difficult to include in the minimum criteria for an effective compliance program. It 
may well be that it is unwise to include, for example, required steps that relate to the 
87 [d. ch. 8, introductory cmt. 
88 [d. 
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implementation of "ethics" or "values-based" compliance programs. But the 
objection should not be that such inquiries are beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. Rather, it should be that either the evidence does not demonstrate that 
these types of programs are necessary to effective compliance, or that "ethics" or 
"values-based" criteria are not fairly administrable. 
CONCLUSION 
I look forward to reviewing the comments that these proposed amendments 
provoke from the public. I assume that the public comments will allow the 
Sentencing Commission to improve on AGOG's work product. However, my final 
hope-as may be evident from the above-is that our work will not only inform the 
Commission's work product, but also will provoke constructive responses from the 
Department of Justice and Congress. 
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Appendix 
Executive Summary of the Report of the Ad Hoc 
Advisory Group on the Organizational Guidelines 
October 7, 2003 
A. Overview 
The Advisory Group's review of the operation and impact of the 
organizational sentencing guidelines, detailed in Part III of this Report, compelled 
the conclusion that the organizational sentencing guidelines have been successful 
in inducing many organizations, both directly and indirectly, to focus on 
compliance and to create programs to prevent and detect violations of law. The 
Advisory Group also concluded, however, that changes can and should be made to 
give organizations greater guidance regarding the factors that are likely to result in 
effective programs to prevent and detect violations of law. Two circumstances 
were particularly influential in shaping the Advisory Group's efforts in this 
respect. 
First, the Advisory Group concluded that recent revelations of widespread 
misconduct in some of the nation's largest publicly held companies-misconduct 
perpetrated at the highest levels of corporate leadership that went undetected 
despite the existence of compliance programs-required evaluation of whether the 
compliance efforts precipitated by the organizational sentencing guidelines could 
be made more effective in preventing and detecting violations of law. The 
Advisory Group drew a variety of lessons from the legislative and regulatory 
responses to the organizational misconduct revealed over the last several years. 
For example, the Advisory Group concluded that the guidelines should better 
address the role of organizational leadership in ensuring that compliance programs 
are valued, supported, periodically re-evaluated, and operate for their intended 
purpose. Further, the recent emphasis by Congress and regulators on a number of 
additional factors, including organizational culture, improved internal reporting 
systems, adequate training, auditing and monitoring, and periodic risk assessments, 
also influenced the Advisory Group's analysis and final recommendations. 
Second, much has changed in the field of organizational compliance since the 
advent of the organizational sentencing guidelines in November 1991. Over the 
last twelve years legal standards in a remarkably diverse range of fields have 
recognized organizational law compliance programs as important features of 
responsible organizational conduct. The legal standards which have emerged are 
often built upon the original organizational sentencing guidelines model. However, 
these standards have increasingly articulated more detailed and sophisticated 
criteria for identifying organizational law compliance programs that warrant 
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favorable organizational treatment. Efforts and experience by industry and private 
organizations have also contributed to an evolution of "best practices" during the 
last decade. In short, the Advisory Group believes that the organizational 
guidelines should be updated to reflect the learning and progress in the compliance 
field since 1991. 
B. Separate guideline/or effective programs 
The Advisory Group proposes that the Sentencing Commission consider 
several specific revisions to the current organizational sentencing guidelines to 
reflect these developments. The Advisory Group recommends that the Sentencing 
Commission promulgate a stand-alone guideline at § SB2.1 defining an "effective 
program to prevent and detect violations of law." (See Appendix B). Many of the 
concepts detailed in the proposed guideline provision are well recognized and are 
currently reflected in Application Note 3(k) to §SA 1.2. 
Within the proposed new guideline that is accompanied by a section-by-
section analysis in Part IV, the Advisory Group recommends that the Sentencing 
Commission make the following modifications and additions: 
• Emphasize the importance within the guidelines of an 
organizational culture that encourages a commitment to 
compliance with the law 
• Provide a definition of "compliance standards and procedures" 
• Specify the responsibilities of an organization's governing 
authority and organizational leadership for compliance 
• Emphasize the importance of adequate resources and authority 
for individuals within organizations with the responsibility for 
the implementation of the effective program 
• Replace the current terminology of "propensity to engage in 
violations of law" with language that defines the nature of an 
organization's efforts to determine when an individual has a 
reason to know, or history of engaging in, violations of law 
• Include training and the dissemination of training materials and 
information within the definition of an "effective program" 
• Add "periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of a program" to 
the requirement for monitoring and auditing systems 
• Require a mechanism for anonymous reporting 
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• Include the phrase "seek guidance about potential or actual 
violations of law" within the criteria in order to more specifically 
encourage prevention and deterrence of violations of law as part 
of compliance programs 
• Provide for the conduct of ongoing risk assessments as part of 
the implementation of an "effective program" 
517 
These proposed changes are intended to eliminate ambiguities revealed by 
twelve years of sentencing experience and to describe more fully those essential 
attributes of successful compliance programs revealed by many years of program 
development and testing. They are also designed to respond to the lessons learned 
through the experience of national corporate scandals over the last two years and to 
synchronize the organizational sentencing guidelines with new federal legislation 
and emerging public and private regulatory requirements. 
C. Role of Waiver in Cooperation 
The Advisory Group also evaluated whether the current organizational 
sentencing guidelines adequately define self-reporting and cooperation, and 
whether the guidelines sufficiently encourage organizations to self-report their own 
illegal conduct and cooperate with federal law enforcement. The Advisory Group 
also examined whether the guidelines should provide commentary on role of the 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work product protection doctrine in 
receiving credit for cooperation under the guidelines. These issues, particularly the 
question of whether the guidelines should be amended to provide some 
commentary on the role of waivers, are of great interest and concern to both the 
U.S. Department of Justice and to members of the defense bar. 
As described at length in Part V of this Report, there is a significant 
divergence of opinion and perceptions among practitioners within the defense bar 
and the U.S. Department of Justice as to this important issue. Several of the 
critical issues examined by the Advisory Group include: (l) the appropriate use of, 
or need for, waivers of privilege as a part of the cooperation process; (2) the level 
of communication and understanding of the U.S. Department of Justice policies 
and practices, and whether there is consistency within various U.S. Attorney's 
Offices; and, (3) the value of suggesting that the organizational sentencing 
guidelines address the role of waivers in obtaining credit for cooperation. 
Following significant analysis and discussion, including a field survey of a number 
of United States Attorney's Offices, the Advisory Group has identified a possible 
approach to modifying the organizational sentencing guidelines in this regard. 
Accordingly, the Advisory Group recommends adding clarifying language 
regarding the role of waiver of such privileges and protections for purposes of 
receiving sentencing credit based on cooperation with the government during the 
investigation and prosecution of an organization. In particular, it suggests 
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amending the Commentary to §8C2.5 and adding Commentary to §8C4.1 as 
follows: 
• Amend the Commentary at Application Note 12 of existing 
Section 8C2.5 by adding the following sentence: 
If the defendant has satisfied the requirements 
for cooperation set forth in this note, waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege and of work product 
protections is not a prerequisite to a reduction in 
culpability score under subsection(g). However, 
in some circumstances waiver of the attorney-
client privilege and of work product protections 
may be required in order to satisfy the 
requirements of cooperation. 
• Amend the Commentary at existing Section 8C4.l by adding 
an Application Note 2 as follows: 
Waiver of Certain Privileges and Protections. -
If the defendant has satisfied the requirements 
for substantial assistance set forth in 
subsection(b)(2), waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege and of work product protections is not 
a prerequisite to a motion for a downward 
departure by the government under this section. 
However, in some circumstances, the 
government may determine that waiver of the 
attorney-client privile ge and of work product 
protections is necessary to ensure substantial 
assistance sufficient to warrant a motion for 
departure. 
D. The Litigation Dilemma 
The Advisory Group also studied whether the effectiveness of compliance 
programs could be enhanced, not only by focusing on internal organizational 
efforts, but also by addressing the exogenous pressures that temper the clear 
benefits of proactive structures. There is substantial evidence demonstrating that, 
as strong as the guidelines' compliance incentives are, equally weighty incentives 
created by forces outside the organization may persuade organizations to pursue 
less than optimal, and in some cases, ineffective compliance programs. 
Specifically, as is explored at length in Part VI of this Report, the institution of 
truly effective programs, the auditing and monitoring that such programs require, 
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and the training and internal reporting systems that such programs contemplate, all 
create a real risk that information generated by these admirable practices will be 
used by other potential litigants to harm the organization. This situation is often 
referred to as the "litigation dilemma," and it is recognized as one of the major 
greatest impediments to the institution or maintenance of truly effective 
compliance programs. 
The litigation dilemma, and the related issue of waivers of attorney-client 
privilege and the work product protection doctrine, also have a potential negative 
impact on organizational incentives to selfreport misconduct and cooperate in the 
investigation and rededication of that wrongdoing. Recognizing that the litigation 
dilemma cannot be resolved within the organizational sentencing guidelines 
themselves, the Advisory Group is compelled by practicality to signal the pivotal 
role that the organizational sentencing guidelines play in this dilemma. 
Consequently, the Advisory Group recommends that the 
Sentencing Commission initiate and foster further dialogue toward a resolution of 
the "litigation dilemma" with appropriate policy makers, including Congress, 
based on the preliminary observations outlined by the Advisory Group in Part VI. 
E. Failure to Implement a Compliance Program 
The Advisory Group considered the recommendation received in the public 
comment for an increase in the culpability score of sentenced organizations for the 
absence of an "effective program." The Advisory Group recommends against such 
an increase because of the disparate impact that such an increase may have on 
small organizations, as is discussed more extensively at Part VII. 
F. Other Aspects of Organizational Sentencing 
Finally, in the course of its work, the Advisory Group identified a number of 
areas relating to the sentencing of organizations that are beyond the scope of its 
mandate and term, but that are in strong need of further study and evaluation. 
Accordingly, as set forth more fully in Part VII, the Advisory Group recommends 
that the Sentencing Commission: 
• Study the supervision of organizations on probation, 
particularly with respect to implementing compliance programs, 
and consider whether the statutory maximum of five years is too 
limiting for this and other purposes of probation' 
• Study the relationship of the fine table to the statutory 
maximum fine 
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• Evaluate the revised definitions of "loss" at §2B 1.1 in the 
context of Chapter Eight and the impact upon organizational 
defendants 
• Focus on training and outreach to small business organizations 
The members of the Advisory Group wish to thank the Sentencing 
Commission for this opportunity to serve the public through its service these past 
eighteen months, and individual members stand ready to assist the Commission 
and other policy makers if called upon for further assistance. 
